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TORTS-LIABILITY LIMITATIONS UNDER THE WARSAW
CONVENTION-Failure to provide adequate notice will not
exclude an air carrier from the damages cap under the
Warsaw Convention for passenger injury or death. The
Supreme Court rejects the purpose-oriented approach to
the Warsaw Convention in favor of effectuating its plain
meaning. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122
(1989).
On September 1, 1983, a Soviet military aircraft shot
down Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight 007 over the Sea of
Japan when the Boeing 747 strayed into Soviet airspace.
All 269 persons on board were killed. The plane, en
route from Kennedy Airport in New York to Seoul, South
Korea, with a refueling stop in Anchorage, Alaska, consti-
tuted an international flight for purposes of the Conven-
tion for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air (Warsaw Convention
or Treaty).'
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No.
876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted following 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982) [hereinafter
Warsaw Convention]. The pertinent parts of article 1 of the Warsaw Convention
read:
(1) This Convention shall apply to all international transportation
of persons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft for hire. It shall
apply equally to gratuitous transportation by aircraft performed by
an air transportation enterprise.
(2) For the purpose of this convention the expression "international
transportation" shall mean any transportation in which, according to
the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the
place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the transpor-
tation or a transshipment are situated either within the territories of
two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High
Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a terri-
tory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of
another power, even though that power is not a party to this conven-
tion. Transportation without such an agreed stopping place be-
tween territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or
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Family members of the victims filed wrongful death
claims against KAL in several federal district courts. Pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1407, all such claims were
transferred for pretrial proceedings to the District Court
of the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs then filed a sum-
mary judgment motion seeking a declaration that KAL's
failure to print Warsaw Convention liability rules2 in ten
point type3 prevented KAL from invoking the damages
limitation.4 The district court denied the motion, finding
that neither the Warsaw Convention nor the Montreal
Agreement provide such a sanction in the event of defec-
tive notice.5 In so doing, the district court specifically re-
jected contrary precedent.6 Under 28 U.S.C. Section
1292(b), the district court certified for interlocutory ap-
peal the issue whether KAL could avail itself of the War-
saw Convention liability protections despite the delivery
of defective tickets to the passengers.
authority of the same High Contracting Party shall not be deemed to
be international for the purposes of this convention.
2Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22. The Convention limited air carrier
liability to 125,000 francs ($8,300) for each passenger. Id. The Montreal Agree-
ment raised this limit to $75,000. Agreement relating to liability limitations of the
Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, Agreement C.A.B. 18,900, I.A.T.A.
Agreement Re: Liability Limitations, 44 C.A.B. 819, reprinted in 31 Fed. Reg. 7302
(1966) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement].
Montreal Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2. Article 2 provides that a notice of
the liability limitation shall be printed in type no smaller than ten point in ink
contrasting with the stock. The notice shall be printed either on each ticket, a
piece of paper placed in the ticket envelope with the ticket or attached to the
ticket, or on the ticket envelope. The Agreement, however, does not specify a
sanction for noncompliance with the notice requirement.
KAL printed the notice of the limitation in eight point type.
In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp. 1463
(D.D.C. 1985), afd, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
6 In re Air Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana, on July 9, 1982, 789 F.2d
1092, 1098 (5th Cir. 1986), reinstated, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987), vacated sub
nom. Pan American World Airways v. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. 1928 (1989) (vacating
opinion to be consistent with Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 109 S. Ct. 1676
(1989); In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d
85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub noma, Polskie Linie Lotnicze v. Robles, 464 U.S. 845
(1983); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), afdper
curiam, 390 U.S. 455 (1967) (4-4 decision); Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,
21 N.Y.2d 160, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14, 234 N.E. 2d 199, (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1039 (1968).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, affirmed:
Absent the failure to deliver any document whatsoever or
the delivery of a document whose shortcomings are so se-
vere that it cannot reasonably constitute a "ticket," an air
carrier will not be deprived of the Warsaw Convention lia-
bility limitations unless the negligence of the air carrier
amounts to wilful misconduct.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. History of the Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention 7 of 1929 comprised the work
of two international conferences, one in Paris in 1925 and
the other in Warsaw in 1929.8 It addressed the two funda-
mental concerns behind the conferences: first, the need
for uniformity in the rights and liabilities of international
air carriers and passengers; 9 and second, the need for lim-
ited liability to protect the fledgling international aviation
industry from large tort recoveries that not only would
discourage investment but potentially could destroy the
air carriers.' °
The Warsaw Convention became effective in 1932 but
was not embraced by the United States until 1934." The
hesitancy reflected American dissatisfaction with the lia-
bility limitation which the United States and other indus-
trialized countries felt were too low.' 2 In 1955, as a result
of American insistence, the Hague Conference convened
to amend the Warsaw Convention, doubling the damages
7 See generally, Kim, Some Consideration of the Draft for the Convention on an Integrated
System of International Aviation Liability, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 765 (1988); Lowenfeld
and Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497
(1967); Note, Torts-International Liability Limitation Agreements, 53 J. AIR L. & CoM.
839 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Torts]; Note, Aviation Law: Attempts to Circumvent the
Limitations of Liability Imposed on Injured Passengers by the Warsaw Convention, 54 Cm-
KENT L. REV. 851 (1978).
8 Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 7, at 498.
9 Id. There was also a need for uniform documentation. Id.
o Id. at 499.
i Id. at 501-02. The United States Senate approved the Treaty by voice vote,
without debate, committee hearing, or report. Id. at 502.
12 Id. at 504.
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cap to $16,600 in the Hague Protocol.'" The United
States, however, never ratified the Hague Protocol. 4 In-
stead, the United States eventually denounced the War-
saw Convention on the basis of its inadequate liability
limitations for passenger injury and death.' 5
The United States indicated it would retract its denun-
ciation if all international air carriers increased the dam-
ages cap to $75,000.16 The aviation industry responded
with The Montreal Agreement in 1966.17 In addition to
the new liability limitation of $75,000, the Montreal
Agreement imposed strict liability on the airlines by re-
quiring air carriers to waive the defense of article 20 of
the Warsaw Convention.' 8 After the major airlines signed
the Montreal Agreement, the United States retracted its
denunciation.' 9
The Montreal Agreement was intended to operate only
until the member nations of the Warsaw Convention
should convene and formally amend the Treaty.2 In
1971, they did so. The passage of the Guatemala Protocol
increased the liability cap to $100,000 and preserved the
strict liability provision of the Montreal Agreement. 2'
The United States, however, neglected to ratify the Gua-
temala Protocol. 22 Nor did the United States adopt sev-
eral amendments, labeled the Montreal Protocols of 1975,
which created an international monetary unit to measure
liability. 3 Thus, only the Warsaw Convention and the
13 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air, opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478
U.N.T.S. 371.
14 Note, Torts, supra note 7, at 847-48, 848 n.59.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 849.
18 Id. Article 20 exempts the air carrier if the air carrier can prove it did every-




22 Id. at 850.
23 Id.
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Montreal Agreement are in effect in the United States.24
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Warsaw Convention
American air passengers aboard international flights
are subject to the Warsaw Convention and the $75,000
liability limitation produced by the Montreal Agreement.
In the past, three events could trigger the removal of the
Treaty limitations: 1) the air carrier's wilful misconduct;
2) the failure to deliver a passenger ticket to a passenger;
and, 3) the failure to provide adequate notice of the limi-
tations cap under the Treaty. 25 The first two events ex-
pressly subject the air carrier to unlimited liability. The
last event, the requirement of adequate notice to preserve
Treaty protections, had been implied by the judiciary. Af-
ter Chan, however, the requirement of adequate notice is
effectively dead.
1. The "Purpose-Oriented" Approach to the Warsaw
Convention
Under the Warsaw Convention, an air carrier must pro-
vide each passenger with a ticket meeting certain require-
ments. 6 If the air carrier transports a passenger without
delivering a ticket, it is excluded from the limited liability
provisions of the Treaty.27 In Ross v. Pan Am Airways, 8
24 Id.
25 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 25, art. 3(2). The requirement of
adequate notice arose by judicial implication. See infra notes 26-65 and accompa-
nying text.
26 Warsaw Convention, art. 3(1) provides:
For the carriage of passengers the carrier must deliver a passenger
ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) the place and date of issue;
(b) the place of departure and of destination;
(c) the agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may reserve
the right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity, and that if
he exercises that right, the alteration shall not have the effect of de-
priving the carriage of its international character.
(d) the name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) a statement that the carriage is subject to the rules relating to
liability established by this Convention.
27 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1 at art. 3(2). This section provides:
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however, the court permitted the airline to assert Treaty
protections despite the fact that the plaintiff, a theatrical-
performer en route to entertain American soldiers in Eu-
rope, never received her ticket.29
In Ross, the plaintiff sought damages of $1,000,000 fol-
lowing an airplane crash that left her a paraplegic. She
claimed that the Warsaw Convention damages cap did not
apply because Pan Am did not deliver a ticket personally
to her. Nevertheless, the court limited her recovery to the
then existing liability cap of $8,300, finding that an im-
plied agency relationship existed between the plaintiff and
a USO officer who had received her ticket.30 The agency
relationship arose because she had permitted the officer
to take care of all embarkation arrangements, including
the responsibility of obtaining her passenger ticket." Yet,
the Treaty expressly prohibits an air carrier from assert-
ing Warsaw liability limitations when a passenger has not
been delivered a passenger ticket. 2 The court explained
that the Warsaw Convention "must be construed reason-
ably and [sic] so as to accomplish its obvious purposes. 33
Ross rejected a literal application of the treaty in favor
of a reasonable, policy-oriented approach, an approach
continued in Grey v. American Airlines.3 4 In that case, the
parents of the plaintiffs died when the American Airlines
DC-6, on an international flight from New York to Mexico
The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket does not
affect the existence or the validity of the contract of carriage, which
shall none the less be subject to the rules of this Convention. Never-
theless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket
having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail himself of
those provisions of this Convention which exclude or limit his
liability.
28 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949). See also With a Song in My Heart (20th
Century Fox 1952) (starring Susan Hayward).
29 Id. at 88, 85 N.E.2d at 882. The plaintiff suffered disabling injuries when the
plane crashed near Lisbon, Portugal, effectively ending her career. Id. at 88, 85
N.E.2d at 881.
3o Id. at 88, 85 N.E.2d at 884.
31 Id.
32 See supra note 27 for text of article 3(2).
3 Ross, 229 N.Y. at 93, 85 N.E. 2d at 885.
34 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.denied, 350 U.S. 989 (1956).
City, crashed at Love Field Airport in Dallas, Texas. The
court allowed the Warsaw liability provisions to apply
even though the ticket did not indicate intermediate
"agreed stopping places" as required by article 3(1)(c) of
the Treaty. 35 The reason is because this "technical and
wholly unsubstantial" omission could not preclude the
Convention protections.3 6
By refusing to employ a literal interpretation of the
Treaty, Ross and Grey launched a judicial trend toward em-
phasizing the Treaty's purpose rather than its plain mean-
ing.3 7  Following this lead, later courts focused on
whether the non-compliance in question was sufficiently
egregious to disqualify the air carrier from the liability
protection, given the purpose of the requirement with
which the air carrier had failed to abide.
For example, the purpose of the notice requirement
under article 338 is to allow the passenger an opportunity
to purchase additional insurance should the passenger de-
cide that the damages cap provides insufficient coverage.
If the air carrier delivers the ticket after the passenger has
boarded the plane, the passenger is deprived of this op-
portunity. Indeed, in Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. , the
Second Circuit held that the Warsaw Convention requires
ticket delivery to the passenger in a manner affording the
passenger reasonable chance to take self-protective meas-
ures. 40  In Mertens, the parents of the decedent com-
35 Id. at 284; Grey v. American Airlines, 95 F. Supp. 756, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
The ticket did not list Love Field as a stopping place. Id.
36 Id. The district court allowed the liability protection because article 3(2)
authorizes the sanction of exclusion only in the event of nondelivery of a ticket.
Grey, 95 F. Supp. at 758. The court concluded that there must be some reason
why articles 4 and 9 forbade the airline to avail itself of limitations for failing to
comply with certain notice requirements while article 3 did not. Id. In this re-
spect, the opinion is similar to Chan.
57 Ross, 299 N.Y. at 93, 85 N.E.2d at 885. The court noted that the twin aims of
the Warsaw Convention, uniformity of laws and limited liability, would be poorly
served by an overly burdensome application of the Treaty. Id. See also Grey, 227
F.2d at 285.
3" See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3.
39 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
40 Id. at 857.
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menced an action when their son perished aboard a Flying
Tiger Line plane that crashed in Japan. According to the
court, the air carrier's failure to deliver the ticket suffi-
ciently in advance of boarding constituted "nondelivery"
under the Treaty, an event that expressly invokes the
sanction of unlimited liability.4' The court explained that
the delivery requirement would "make little sense if it
could be satisfied when the aircraft was several thousand
feet in the air. "42
Likewise, in Warren v. Flying Tiger Line43 the court barred
the Warsaw Convention damages cap because the air car-
rier delivered passenger tickets at the foot of the ramp
leading to the plane just before take off. Specifically, de-
livery at the ramp did not allow reasonable time for the
passengers to purchase additional insurance. 44 There-
fore, the court allowed the plaintiffs, the personal repre-
sentatives of the military passengers killed aboard the
defendant's plane en route from Travis Air Force Base to
Vietnam, to assert a cause of action under article 3 of the
Warsaw Convention.
As in Mertens, the court found that delivery of passenger
tickets in this case was too late to constitute "delivery"
within the meaning of article 3(2).45 Since none of the
passengers were given a reasonable chance to purchase
coverage above the Treaty limitation, the air carrier de-
nied them "a right which was intended to be afforded
them as a concomitant to the carrier's right to limit its lia-
bility."' 46 The court considered the purpose of the limita-
tions cap to both the air carrier and the passenger and
prevented application of the Treaty aegis even though,
41 Id.
42 Id.
4, 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
44 Id. at 496. The court also noted that the warning of the liability limitation
was in such fine print that it would be difficult to read it without a magnifying
glass. Id. at 497.
45 Id. at 498.
46 Id.
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technically, the air carrier had fully complied with article
347
In Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane,48 the court expanded
upon the purpose of adequate delivery to include the re-
quirement of adequate notice of limited liability. In Lisi,
the defendant failed to give the passengers adequate no-
tice by printing the limitations in such small print,
unemphasized by bold face type or contrasting color, as to
effectively camouflage its presence.49 The court under-
stood the Mertens and Warren cases to apply Warsaw Con-
vention articles only if "the ticket was delivered to the
passenger in such a manner as to afford him a reasonable
opportunity to take self-protective measures." 5 Signifi-
cantly, however, those cases turned upon the timing of
physical delivery, not the adequacy of the print on the
ticket.5'
Nevertheless, the Lisi court found inadequate print
analogous to dilatory delivery so as to bar invocation of
the damages cap. Both deficiencies prevent the passenger
from purchasing additional insurance. To allow limited
liability removes the quid pro quo, for the arbitrary liabil-
ity limitations under the Treaty are especially unfair if
47 Id. at 497. Mertens and Warren do not contradict Ross. Admittedly, the results
in the cases are different but all three courts reject a literal interpretation of the
Convention. See id. at 494; Mertens, 341 F.2d at 851; Ross, 299 N.Y. at 88, 85
N.E.2d at 880. In fact, had the three cases been litigated after the Supreme
Court's decision in Chan, the air carrier could have successfully enacted the liabil-
ity provisions in each case. See Chan, 490 U.S. at 122.
48 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 455 (1967) (4-4
decision).
49 Id. at 514. See Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, 253 F. Supp. 237, 240-242
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (photocopy of the ticket and notice provision therein). The
plane, en route from Rome to New York, crashed in Ireland. Five suits were con-
solidated in the district court for wrongful death, personal injury and property
damages, allegedly sustained by the thirteen passengers aboard the flight. Id. at
510.
so Lisi, 370 F.2d at 512.
51 See Boryk v. Argentinas, 332 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (verbal delivery of
liability statement sufficient to constitute physical delivery within the meaning of
article 3(2)).
52 The court also relied upon Mertens. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying
text; Lisi, 370 F.2d at 514-516.
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they apply when the air carrier has not allowed its passen-
gers to further insure their lives.53
The Lisi opinion focused on implied notice require-
ments of article 3. Even if an air carrier delivers the ticket,
the notice must be conspicuous and interpretable.54 As
such, 55 Lisi represents the first case to require adequate
notice in addition to adequate delivery.56
The Second Circuit adhered to the implied requirement
of adequate notice in In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Po-
land, on March 14, 1980. 7 In that case, the court stripped
the airlines of the Convention liability limitations when
the defendant printed notice in 8.5 point type rather than
5s Lisi, 370 F.2d at 513. Alitalia relied on Grey to argue that a technical and
unsubstantial defect should not preclude Convention provisions. Id. at 513 n.8.
The circuit court disagreed, stating that the issue in Grey was whether the failure
to include agreed stopping places on the ticket deprived the passengers of a rea-
sonable opportunity to take self-protective measures. Id. Since the stops had no
effect on the international character of the flight, it did not deprive the passengers
of such an opportunity. Thus, "delivery" of the ticket had taken place. Id.
- Id. at 514 n.10. The court found it highly questionable whether a passenger
could understand if his flight constituted "international carriage" when the air
carrier did not define the term. Id. Moreover, the carrier's liability was expressed
in French gold Francs, thereby making it difficult for the passenger to determine
the dollar amount for which his life had been insured. Id.
55 The dissent accused the majority ofjudicial treaty-making. Id. at 515. Previ-
ous cases were based on facts tantamount to no effective preflight delivery. Id.
This is scarcely relevant to the case in question, in which the tickets were delivered
from three to thirty-three days in advance. Id. The dissent further stated that
actual notice is not required; should such a requirement be needed, it is up to the
legislative and executive branches of the government to implement any changes.
Id.
56 See Egan, 21 N.Y.2d at 160, 234 N.E.2d at 199, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 14. The facts
of Egan are quite similar to Lisi. The air carrier delivered a notice in 4.5 point
type. The court held that this notice was inadequate to provide the passenger the
opportunity to take self-protective measures despite the fact it complied with arti-
cle 3 of the Warsaw Convention. Id. at 203. Hence, both Egan and Lisi rejected a
literal interpretation of the treaty when to do so would conflict with the treaty's
purpose.
57 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Polskie Linie Lotnicze v. Robles,
464 U.S. 845 (1983). An Ilyushin 62-M aircraft owned and operated by the de-
fendant air carrier crashed while on its landing approach in Warsaw, Poland.
Eight of the nine decedents were members of the United States Amateur Athletic
Union Boxing Team traveling to Warsaw for a tournament. The ninth decedent
was the wife of the team physician. The plaintiffs who filed suit were the survivors
of these passengers. Id. at 86.
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ten point type as required by the Montreal Agreement.5"
The defendant admitted it had not complied with the
Agreement, but argued it had provided adequate notice
nonetheless. 59  The court, however, suggested that ten
point type represents the floor boundary of adequate no-
tice by holding the air carrier disqualified from the liabil-
ity limitations of the Convention for the failure to comply
with the Montreal Agreement's notice requirement.60
Initially, it may seem the Second Circuit employed a lit-
eral interpretative approach to the Treaty rather than the
purpose-oriented interpretation of earlier decisions.6 '
The court's approach, however, was hardly literal. For
example, the court neglected to consider whether 8.5
point type qualified as a defective ticket within the mean-
ing of article 3(2) of the Warsaw Convention. 2 Also, the
court failed to explain how the Montreal Agreement pro-
vides a sanction for non-compliance. In fact, the Agree-
ment is completely silent on the matter.63  A literal
interpretation, therefore, would have allowed the liability
limitations since no provision in either the Warsaw Con-
.-. See Montreal Agreement, supra note 2. The cases discussed above were de-
cided before the United States signed the Montreal Agreement. The Agreement
is a "special contract" under article 22(1) of the Convention (allowing the air car-
rier to agree to a higher liability limit) that effectively modifies the Convention
insofar as those flights have the United States as a place of departure, stopping, or
termination point. In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on March 14, 1980,
705 F.2d at 88. The Agreement imposes strict liability in exchange for the limita-
tions cap. Montreal Agreement, art. 20(1).
59 In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d at
89 (citing Mertens, 341 F.2d at 856; Warren, 353 F.2d at 498).
60 Id.; See also In re Air Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana on July 9, 1982,
789 F.2d at 1098 (reading the 10 point requirement in the Montreal Agreement to
provide the floor level of compliance for purposes of adequate notice); In re Air
Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on March 14, 1980, 748 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1984)
(air carrier's failure to deliver a ticket with adequate notice barred Convention
protection even though another carrier had delivered a proper ticket for another
portion of the flight). Contra Stratis v. Eastern Airlines, 682 F.2d 406 (2d Cir.
1982) (carrier could invoke the damages cap because the passenger had been de-
livered a domestic ticket with the proper notice).
a' See supra notes 27-51 and accompanying text.
62 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3. This article allows the air carrier
to avail itself of the damages cap in such cases.
6-1 Montreal Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 22.
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vention or Montreal Agreement expressly bar it.6 4
This approach to the Treaty betrays the court's frustra-
tion with the limited liability provision insofar as it pre-
vents complete redress for an injured plaintiff by those
most responsible for the harm.
2. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983 65
Against this back drop of the purpose-oriented inter-
pretive approach to the Warsaw Convention, the District
Court for the District of Columbia reexamined the im-
plied nexus between adequate notice and limited liabil-
ity. 66 The court held that the damages limitation
established by the Treaty was enforceable even though
Korean Air Lines printed the liability statement in eight
point type, reasoning that the plain meaning of the Treaty
did not authorize unlimited liability in the event of inade-
quate notice.6 7 Further, the court found no evidence from
the drafting history or the signatory nations that the liabil-
- This casenote does not discuss the judicial approach to either article 4 (bag-
gage checks) or articles 8 and 9 (air waybills) of the Convention. As with article 3,
courts have disagreed as to whether a literal or practical approach is proper. E.g.
Republic Nat'l Bank of New York v. Eastern Airlines, 815 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1987).
In Eastern Airlines, the defendant's failure to comply with the literal terms of article
4 was not fatal to its right to invoke the liability limitations because, though the
ticket did not contain the weight of the baggage as required by article 4(3)(f),
(article 4(4) disallows liability limitations if this defect exists), the defect did not
prejudice Republic from obtaining additional insurance since it was on notice of
the Convention's applicability, knew the approximate weight of the baggage, and
was aware of the high value of the bag's contents. Id. at 236-37. Likewise, the
court found that the failure to record the ticket number in accordance with article
4(d) was not prejudicial. Id. See also Martin v. Pan Am. World Airways, 563 F.
Supp. 135, 139 (D.D.C. 1983) ("[T]he court must follow the fundamental princi-
ple that a treaty, whether construed strictly or liberally, must be interpreted to
effectuate its evident purpose."). Contra Gill v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 620 F.
Supp. 1453 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (language of article 4 should be given its plain mean-
ing and improper notice, like the failure to issue a ticket number and the failure to
record the number and weight of the bags, forecloses invocation of the liability
protection); Maghsoudi v. Pan Am. World Airways, 470 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Haw.
1979) (strict construction of article 4 precludes liability protection for failure to
record the weight of passenger baggage). For a discussion of the judicial ap-
proach to articles 3, 4, 8 and 9 see Note, Torts at 949.
664 F. Supp. 1463 (D.D.C. 1985), affid 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1472-1474.
67 Id. at 1476.
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ity limitation depended upon proper notice.68
To the contrary, the literal interpretation of article 3 of
the Warsaw Convention subjects the air carrier to unlim-
ited liability only in the event of nondelivery.69 That is,
the liability limitation is not dependent upon a notice
statement.70 The district court admitted its holding
seemed inequitable but noted that a literal application of
the Treaty accorded the meaning evident from the negoti-
ation of its drafters. 71 Besides, according to the court, it is
not the business of the judiciary to engage in treatymak-
ing.72 This judicial activism reveals the role in which pre-
vious courts employing the purpose-oriented approach
have engaged 73 and reflects the judiciary's irritation with
the notion that courts are prevented from fully compen-
sating plaintiffs under the Warsaw Convention.7 4 The dis-
trict court concluded that the unfairness can only be
eradicated through the political process.
II. CHAN V. KOREAN AIR LINES
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the dispute between the lower courts on the issue
of whether there is an implied requirement of adequate
notice that precludes the air carrier from asserting limited
liability under the Treaty. Though the holding was unani-
mously affirmed, the majority and the concurrence em-
phatically disagreed as to the proper interpretive
approach to the Warsaw Convention. Justice Scalia, writ-
- Id. at 1474.
69 Id. The Supreme Court of Canada agrees. See Ludecke v. Canadian Pacific
Air Lines, Ltd., 12 Avi. Cas. (CCH) 17,191 (Que. Super. Ct. 1971). In that case,
the Canadian Supreme Court allowed the air carrier to avail itself of the damages
cap when it printed the liability statement in 4.5 point type. Id. The Court re-
jected the interpretive approach of the American courts, stating that article 3 was
clear: improper notice amounts to a defective ticket, the issuance of which explic-
itly preserves the Treaty protections. Id. at 17,192.
70 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp. at 1474.
I7 ld. at 1477.
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ing for the majority, 75 held that the literal words must
govern, that judges must effectuate the plain meeting of
the Treaty. Justice Brennan's concurrence responded
that misguided adherence to literalism prevents a judge
from enforcing the intention of the drafters. 6 In his view,
courts should go beyond the literal words when to do so
would reflect the policies and goals set forth in the Treaty.
The structure of the opinion focused first on the proper
interpretation of article 3 and second on the relevance of
structural differences in article 4 (baggage checks) and ar-
ticle 9 (air waybills).
A. The Meaning of Article 3
The Court noted that the plaintiffs, family members of
the decedents, had admitted that the Montreal Agreement
does not itself impose a sanction for the failure to comply
with the ten point type requirement.77 Rather, the peti-
tioners contended the sanction arose through a reading of
the Montreal Agreement in conjunction with the Warsaw
Convention. The plaintiffs asserted that first, article 3 of
the Warsaw Convention precludes the liability limitations
if a carrier neglects to provide adequate notice of the
Warsaw Convention's liability cap on its passenger ticket,
and that second, the Montreal Agreement's ten point type
requirement presents the minimum standard of adequate
notice under article 3.78
The majority rejected the first point and thus never dis-
cussed the second. The concurrence agreed on the first
point but disagreed with the second, that the Montreal
Agreement provided the minimum level of compliance.
The importance of the holding, however, is that, absent
wilful misconduct, air carriers are now subject to unlim-
7. Chan v. Korean Airlines, 490 U.S. 122, 123 (1989). Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Associate Justices White, O'Connor and Kennedy joined in the majority. Id.
76 Id. at 136, (Brennan, J., concurring). Associate Justices Marshall, Blackmun
and Stevens joined the concurrence. Id.
77 Id. at 125.
7. Id. at 126.
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ited liability for passenger injury only if they accept a pas-
senger without delivering a passenger ticket.79
This result proceeds from the majority's construction of
article 3 in which the Court held that article 3(2)80 did not
contemplate a sanction for issuing a passenger ticket fail-
ing to comply with the requirements of the Warsaw Con-
vention.8 1  Rather, article 3(2) specifies that an
"irregularity ' 8 2 of the passenger ticket will not impair the
validity of the transportation contract.8 3 Thus, an irregu-
larity such as inadequate notice does not remove a docu-
ment from its status as a passenger ticket or from the
contractual damages limitation of the Convention. 4 Ac-
cording to the majority, the second sentence of article
3(2)85 subjects the air carrier to unlimited liability only if
the carrier fails to deliver any document whatsoever or de-
livers a document with shortcomings so severe that it can-
not reasonably be labeled a "ticket."'8 6 Consequently, the
validity of article 3 is not conditioned by an implied re-
quirement of adequate notice. 7
In contrast, the concurrence construed article 3 to im-
pose unlimited liability upon the air carrier in the event of
inadequate notice. The concurrence disagreed with the
Court's deconstruction of article 3, suggesting that the
79 Id. at 128-29.
so See supra note 27 for a discussion of article 3(2).
" Chan, 490 U.S. at 128-29.
82 Id. Scalia found the meaning of irregularity in Webster's Second Interna-




8 Id. at 128. The majority interpreted the first sentence of article 3(2) to make
clear that defective notice will not cause forfeiture of limited liability. Id.
86 Id. at 129. Scalia gives as an example a blank form with no data filled in. Id.
The question remains as to whether his example is the universe of defective tick-
ets that would trigger the article 3(2) penalty. While Scalia felt the use of eight
point type instead of the requisite ten point type was not a shortcoming of such
magnitude, (as the concurrence did), he leaves open whether a ticket with no
warning at all would give rise to unlimited liability. Id. Ostensibly, if notice is not
a requirement, the air carrier no longer has to print any warning whatsoever of
the Warsaw Convention limitation.
87 Id.
9531991]
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term "passenger ticket" used in article 3(2) is an abbrevia-
tion of the longer phrase used to describe a ticket in arti-
cle 3(1).88 Logically, then, if a ticket does not contain all
the requisite elements under article 3(1), it is not a pas-
senger ticket.8 9 Hence, article 3(2) subjects the air carrier
to unlimited liability for accepting a passenger without a
"regular passenger ticket". 0 More importantly for the
concurrence, if "passenger ticket" means "regular pas-
senger ticket," then under article 3(2), the failure to de-
liver a "regular passenger ticket" will not impair the
validity of the Treaty. 9' The reason is because the second
sentence of article 3(2) still applies.92 According to the
concurrence then, if the air carrier fails to deliver a "regu-
lar passenger ticket," the Warsaw Convention provisions
nevertheless apply, 93 and one provision, namely article
3(2), prohibits the air carrier from invoking limited liabil-
ity in certain circumstances.94
The majority responded that this strict interpretation
produces absurd and nonsensical results.9 5 The majority
reasoned that a prudent draftsman intending to provide a
al Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., concurring). That section requires the air carrier to
deliver "a passenger ticket which shall contain the following particulars . . . a
statement that the carriage is subject to the rules relating to liability established by
this Convention." Id.
89 See supra note 26. For the concurrence, article 3(2) holds the carrier to all the
obligations of the Convention but denies the benefit of the liability limit. There-
fore, according to the concurrence, the article subjects the air carrier to limited
liability.
- Chan, 490 U.S. at 137-38. For a discussion of why inadequate notice in par-
ticular subjects the air carrier to unlimited liability see infra notes 117-140 and
accompanying text.
91 Id. at 137. Regardless of the meaning of "passenger ticket," article 3(2)
"provides that the 'absence, irregularity or loss' of a ticket shall not effect the
validity of the contract, 'which shall none the less be subject to the rules of this
convention.'" Id.
92 Id. The concurrence argues that the rule of the second sentence of article
3(2) subjects the carrier to unlimited liability in case of the nondelivery of a "regu-
lar passenger ticket."
9 Id. at 138.
'4 See supra note 27 for the text of article 3(2). The concurrence concludes that
the intent of article 3(2) is to hold the carrier to Convention obligations and to
deny Convention benefits if it fails to comply with certain requirements. Chan,
490 U.S. at 138 (Brennan, J., concurring).
9s Id. at 129 n.3.
short hand for the elements of a passenger ticket listed in
article 3(1) would do so by using the language "such a
passenger ticket."' 96 Further, the majority argued that if
"passenger ticket" in article 3(2) is to mean "regular pas-
senger ticket," then the first sentence of article 3(2) no
longer makes any sense - "the ... irregularity ... of a
regular passenger ticket shall not affect the existence or
the validity of the contract of transportation. 9 7 The only
way to avoid this construction is to define an "irregular-
ity" as meaning something other than the failure to com-
ply with all the requirements of article 3(l).98 But, as the
majority pointed out, there is no plausible "something
other."'
Moreover, the majority suggested that there is no tex-
tual limitation to confine the "defective-ticket-is-no-
ticket" theory to the requirement of adequate notice.'0 0
The opinion further stated that the concurrence would
subject the air carrier to unlimited exposure for failing to
comply with the particular requirement that the address





1- Id. at 130.
1o, Id. The concurrence counters that the drafters debated the proper means to
enforce compliance with certain "obligatory" or essential particulars of the trans-
portation documents, considering the imposition of civil and criminal penalties
for noncompliance but ultimately deciding that the loss of Convention protection
would effectively compel compliance. Id. at 141-42.
Essential particulars are those relating to the international character of the
transportation. Id. at 141. While the requirement of name and address of the
carrier is seemingly unnecessary to demonstrate the international character of the
transportation, the drafters nonetheless expressly deemed such particulars as es-
sential or obligatory. Id. It is possible this information was thought essential to
establish the air carrier's domicile for jurisdictional purposes under article 28 of
the Treaty. Id. at 141-42. Hence, the concurrence responded that what the ma-
jority considers an absurd result, subjecting the air carrier to unlimited liability for
failing to list its address and name, was a result precisely intended by the drafters
at one time. id. at 141. See also infra notes 122-140 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining why, according to the concurrence, the requirement of adequate notice
conditions the air carriers' right to invoke the Warsaw Convention liability
protections).
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The majority next dismisses the concurrence's interpre-
tation of the first sentence of article 3(2).1°2 Under the
concurrence's construction, if a "regular passenger
ticket" is not delivered, the limited liability rule shall not
apply. 10 3 The majority replies that if "passenger ticket" is
not defined by the particulars under article 3(1), then arti-
cle 3(2) is given its most logical meaning: a carrier failing
to deliver any passenger ticket whatsoever is subject to
unlimited liability, but a carrier delivering an irregular
passenger ticket may invoke the Treaty limitations cap. t °4
Thus, the majority read the two sentences under article
3(2) to be exclusive, finding the concurrence to be incor-
rect insofar as the concurrence understands the first sen-
tence of article 3(2) to incorporate the second. Why else,
the majority asks, does the second sentence begin with the
word "[N]evertheless"?1 05
The majority interpreted "nevertheless" to indicate an
exception to the operation of the first sentence, "not a
specification of something already included within it."' 06
Should the concurrence's construction be correct, the sec-
ond sentence of article 3(2), according to the majority,
would have been written as a new clause beginning with
"including the rule that."' 1 7 Thus, the plain meaning of
the second sentence states that when the "absence" of a
"passenger ticket" is due to ticket nondelivery, the air car-
rier shall nevertheless be unable to avail himself of the lim-
ited liability rules. 08
The concurrence answers that the majority's failure to
accept its interpretation results from the misplaced literal-
ism and disregard of context in its approach to the
102 That is, the concurrence's reading that the language, "irregular ticket shall
nonetheless be subject to the rules of this convention" includes among those
rules, the rule of the second sentence of article 3(2). See supra notes 92-95 and
accompanying text.







Treaty. 0 9 Noting that an analysis of the drafting history
of the Warsaw Convention reveals that there is no support
for the Court's understanding of article 3,' l° the concur-
rence points out that the draft of article 3 presented to the
Warsaw Conference placed the first and second sentences
of Article 3(2) in completely separate paragraphs."'
Thus, there is no indication that the drafters intended a
substantive change by combining the two paragraphs. 1 2
The concurrence thinks it more likely that when the draft-
ers reduced the two paragraphs to the two sentences of
article 3(2), the word "nevertheless" ("toutefois") was
placed between the sentences as a transition.'13
The majority responds to this final assault upon its in-
terpretation of article 3 by pointing out that at the very
least the concurrence ought to have the strength of its
convictions." 4 That is, the concurrence rejects its own
reading of article 3 by stating the omission of any single
1- Id. at 138 n.5.
11 Id
I Id. The draft version reads as follows:
In the carriage of travelers the carrier shall be required to deliver
a passenger ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) the place and date of issue;
(b) the points of departure and destination;
(c) summary indication of the route to be followed (via) as well as
the contemplated stopping places;
(d) the name and address of the carrier or carriers;
The passenger ticket shall contain, moreover, a clause stipulating
that the carriage is subject to the system of liability set forth by the
present Convention.
The presence, irregularity, or loss of this document of carriage
shall not prejudice either the existence or the validity of the contract
of carriage.
If, for international carriage, the carrier accepts the traveler with-
out having drawn up a passenger ticket, or if the ticket does not con-
tain the particulars indicated hereabove, the contract of carriage
shall nonetheless be subject to the rules of the present Convention,
but the carrier shall not have the right to avail himself of the provi-
sions of this Convention which exclude in all or in part his direct
liability or that derived from the faults of his servants. Id. at 1688
n.8.
112 Id. at 138 n.5.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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particular listed in article 3(1) does not necessarily impose
the sanction of the second sentence of article 3(2). 1 5
B. The Relevance of Articles 4 and 8
After developing and defending the Court's interpreta-
tion of article 3, the majority next turns to articles 4, 8 and
9 to further conclude that inadequate notice will not elim-
inate the liability limitation." 16 In identical terms, articles
I' ld. at 134-35 n.5.
s, Id. at 130. The relevant provisions of articles 4, 8 and 9 read:
Article 4
(3) The baggage check shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(d) The number of the passenger ticket;
(e) A statement that delivery of the baggage will be made to the
bearer of the baggage check;
(f) The number and weight of the packages;
(g) The amount of the value declared in accordance with article
22(2);
(h) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relat-
ing to liability established by this convention.
(4) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the baggage check shall not
affect the existence or the validity of the contract of transportation
which shall none the less be subject to the rules of this convention.
Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts baggage without a baggage check
having been delivered, or if the baggage check does not contain the
particulars set out at (d), (f) and (h) above, the carrier shall not be
entitled to avail himself of those provisions of the convention which
exclude or limit the liability.
Article 8
The air waybill shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of its execution;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may re-
serve the right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity, and
that if he exercises that right the alteration shall not have the effect
of depriving the transportation of its international character;
(d) The name and address of the consignor;
(e) The name and address of the first carrier;
(f) The name and address of the consignee if the case so requires;
(g) The nature of the goods;
(h) The number of packages, the method of packing, and the partic-
ular marks or numbers upon them;
(i) The weight, the quantity, the volume, or dimensions of the
goods;
(j) The apparent condition of the goods and of the packing;
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3(1), 4(3)(h), and 8 (q) require a statement of the liability
limitation under the Warsaw Convention. The three arti-
cles also subject the air carrier to unlimited liability if the
relevant document, ticket, baggage check or air waybill,
has not been delivered to the passenger prior to depar-
ture.1 7 Unlike article 4 and article 9, however, article 3
does not authorize the same sanction for the failure to
provide notice." 18
For this reason, articles 4 and 9 confirm what the text of
article 3(2) already makes clear: the delivery of a docu-
ment failing to provide notice of the liability limitations is
different from the failure to deliver a document."l 9 The
majority states that it would be a flouting of the text to
(k) The freight, if it has been agreed upon, the date and place of
payment, and the person who is to pay it;
(1) If the goods are sent for payment on delivery, the price of the
goods, and, if the case so requires, the amount of the expenses
incurred;
(m) The amount of the value declared in accordance with article
22(2);
(n) The number of parts of the air waybill;
(o) The documents handed to the carrier to accompany the air
waybill;
(p) The time fixed for the completion of the transportation and a
brief note of the route to be followed, if these matters have been
agreed upon;
(q) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relat-
ing to liability established by this convention.
Article 9
If the carrier accepts goods without an air waybill having been
made out, or if the air waybill does not contain all the particulars set
out in article 8(a) to (i), inclusive, and (q), the carrier shall not be
entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention which
exclude or limit his liability.
Id. at 131-32 n.4.
117 Id. at 131.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 131-32. The majority disagrees with the petitioners that it would be
absurd for defective notice to preclude liability limits on baggage checks and air
freight yet not for passenger injury or death. The $8,300 limit ratified in 1929
might have been considered adequate so that a passenger who did not purchase
additional coverage because of defective notice would be sufficiently insured in
any event. Id. at 133. The survivors of the decedent receive equitable treatment.
Id. In contrast, limited liability for baggage and freight does not suggest so much
a concern for value as it does for a fair level of liability commensurate with profit.
Id. Thus, the shipper of baggage and freight, having been deprived of adequate
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imply in article 3 a "sanction not only withheld there but
explicitly granted elsewhere."12 o
In a response that exhaustively examines the history of
the Warsaw Convention drafts, the concurrence implies
that, while no one can be certain as to the proper literal
meaning of article 3, the majority has flouted the inten-
tion of the drafters. The drafters of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, the Comite International Technique D'Experts
Juridiques Aerienes (CITEJA), excluded the benefit of lia-
bility limitation if a passenger ticket did not contain cer-
tain listed particulars, including the failure to provide
notice of the damages cap.' 2' The drafting notes make
clear that CITEJA intended to apply a uniform regime of
sanctions for the failure to comply with the provision
listed in articles 3, 4 and 8.122 At the third session of
CITEJA, the draft of article 3 contained provisions similar
to those foreseen for the air waybill (article 8), including
the statement that if no notice is provided, the Warsaw
Convention is still in effect except for the provisions
shielding the air carrier from total or partial liability. 23
Hence, CITEJA reports indicate an intended parallelism
of approach to the three types of transportation docu-
notice, would not receive equitable treatment since the shipper never had the op-
portunity to insure the carriage. Id.
The majority suggests other possible reasons why the sanctions exist for inade-
quate notice under articles 4 and 8 but not under article 3. Id. First, the liability
limitations for baggage and freight are much more substantial. Id. Second, per-
haps the drafters believed passengers were more likely to insure their carriage
than their lives. Id. Freight is lost more frequently than passengers. Moreover,
the Convention provides a means to protect carriage at the airport for the bag-
gage and freight on condition the passenger specially declares the value upon
delivery. Id.
The majority's point is that the interpretation of article 3 is by no means absurd.
Since the text of article 3 does not produce an absurd result, it cannot be dis-
missed as an obvious drafting error. The plain meaning must therefore govern
with no reference to the complicated drafting history. Id. at 1683-84. For the
majority, where the text is clear, the drafting history should not be inspected,
particularly when the structure of the document, namely articles 4, 8 and 9, con-
firm rather than subvert the text. Id.
120 Id. at 133.
121 Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., concurring).
122 Id.
12 Id. at 140.
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ments: "[t]he sanction for transporting passengers with-
out regular tickets is the same as that for the
transportation of baggage and goods." 24
The concurrence next examines why article 3 lost its
uniformity with the provisions for air waybills and bag-
gage checks. To begin with, there is some ambiguity as to
whether the notice clause was actually among those par-
ticulars required to preserve the Warsaw Convention lia-
bility protections. 25 The article 3 notice requirement in
' ' Id. Furthermore, a report prepared on behalf of CITEJA accompanying its
final draft stated "[T]he sanction provided... for carriage of passengers without a
ticket or with a ticket not conforming to the Convention is identical to that provided ...
for carriage of baggage and goods. Idt at 140-41 (quoting Second International
Conference on Private Aeronautical Law Minutes 247 (R. Homer & D. Kegrez
trans. 1975) (emphasis added).
125 See supra note 112 (draft version of article 3). The CITEJA draft of article 4
reads:
In the carriage of baggage, other than small personal objects of
which the passenger himself retains custody, the carrier shall deliver
a baggage check.
It shall contain the following particulars:
(a) the place and date of issue;
(b) the points of departure and of destinations;
(c) summary indication of the route to be followed (via) as well as
the contemplated stopping places;
(d) the name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) the number of the passenger ticket;
(f) indication that the check is made out in duplicate;
(g) indication that the delivery of the baggage to the traveler shall
be validly made to the bearer of the check.
The baggage check shall contain, moreover, a clause stipulating that the car-
riage is subject to the system of liability set forth by the Convention.
The absence, irregularity, or loss of this baggage check shall not prejudice
either the existence or the validity of the contract of carriage.
If, for the international carriage, the carrier accepts baggage without having
made out a ticket, or if the ticket does not contain the particulars indicated her-
eabove up to and including (d), the contract of the carriage shall nonetheless be
subject to the rules of the present Convention, but the carrier shall not have the
right to avail himself of the provisions of this Convention, which exclude in all or
in part his direct liability or that derived from the faults of his servant. Id. at 143
n.9.
The draft form of article 8 specified fifteen particulars the waybill was to contain
of which (a) through (g) were deemed compulsory. Id. at 143-44 n.10.
A separate article 9 required that the air waybill contain a statement of limited
liability governed by the Warsaw Convention. Article 17 excluded an air carrier
from invoking the liability protection if the carrier failed to comply with all the
elements of article 8(a) through (g) inclusive or with the notice requirement of
article 9. Id.
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the final draft was not listed under a letter of the alphabet
but rather as a separate paragraph. Likewise, the drafters
listed the article 4 notice requirement in a separate para-
graph yet failed to state whether noncompliance would
give rise to unlimited liability. On the other hand, article
8, the air waybill provision clearly required the notice of
limited liability to benefit from the damages cap. 126
To remedy this uncertainty, the Japanese delegation to
the Warsaw Convention proposed an amendment to arti-
cles 3 and 4, the passage of which placed the identical lia-
bility clauses of both articles as a lettered particular. This
made clear that the liability clause was to be treated as an
essential particular. 7 The purpose of the amendment,
however, remains unclear, for there was no floor discus-
sion debating its passage. 2 8 In any case, had only this
amendment addressed the notice requirements, it would
be clear that the failure to provide the liability statement
precludes invocation of the damages limitation. 12 9
Unfortunately, a second amendment proposed by the
Greek delegation revived the ambiguity. The Greek dele-
gation had repeatedly criticized the sanctions clause as
too harsh. The delegation, therefore, proposed an
amendment to remedy the perceived unfairness to the air
carrier. This amendment deleted from article 3(2) the
language, "or if the ticket does not contain the particulars
above," while rewriting the parallel article 4 particular as
a listed particular in order to conform in structure with
article 9.130 Thus, a difference exists between the final
structure of article 3 and that of articles 4 and 9.13
At this point in its extensive study of the drafting his-
tory of the Warsaw Convention, the concurrence con-
cedes that the majority may be correct in holding the
drafters intended the substantive differences between the
126 Id.
127 I1 at 144.
128 it
"2 Id.
1o Id. at 145.
13' 1&
articles insofar as sanctions are concerned. Ultimately,
however, the concurrence rejects the majority's construc-
tion. The concurrence points out that the Solicitor Gen-
eral of the United States felt the difference reveals a
drafting error caused by the difficulty in coordinating the
Japanese and Greek amendments. 3 2 Moreover, it is puz-
zling for the concurrence that such a significant departure
from efforts to provide a uniform scheme between all
three articles would not be reflected anywhere in the
drafting history.' 33
With this in mind, the concurrence returns for a closer
examination of the Greek amendment, finding that the
amendment did not intend to provide different treatment
for passenger tickets.1M Rather, the Greek amendment
reflected the concern that a simple omission135 caused by
employee negligence would lead to an overly severe pun-
ishment. Because the amendment addressed clerical er-
rors in the filling of ticket forms, 36 an effort to remove
such minor errors from the list of particulars that subject
the air carrier to unlimited liability would not be inconsis-
tent with the intent to preserve the sanction for the failure
to provide a liability statement. 3 7 Conceivably then,
since the liability statement in article 3 consisted of a sep-
arate paragraph rather than a listed particular at the time
the Greek amendment was debated, the removal of the
language "or if the ticket does not contain the particulars
indicated above" did not address the liability statement at
all. 1' It follows that the amendment never intended to
render the liability statement any less essential than it is in
articles 4 and 9.139
,,2 Id
133 Id




I- Id. at 147.
159 Id.
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C. The Holding
The differences in the interpretive approach notwith-
standing, the Court allowed Korean Air Lines the limita-
tions cap. 4  The majority did so because, absent wilful
misconduct, an air carrier may avail itself of the Treaty
aegis unless it has failed to deliver a passenger ticket. The
petitioners misread article 3 to imply a requirement of
"adequate notice" before an air carrier can enjoy limited
liability.
The concurrence agreed with the result, but not the ra-
tionale. Restated, the concurrence agreed with the peti-
tioners that article 3 requires "adequate notice" to invoke
the protection but disagreed that the Montreal Agree-
ment, in requiring the statement be printed in ten point
type, sets the minimum level of compliance.
While the majority rejected a purpose-oriented ap-
proach to the Warsaw Convention, the concurrence aligns
itself with those courts focusing on whether the passenger
received adequate notice. The concurrence, however,
overturned the brightline approach of some of these
courts in which the ten point requirement of the Montreal
Agreement defined the floor boundary of "adequate no-
tice." It found that the eight point type in the case at bar
constituted adequate notice under any "conventional" in-
terpretation of that term.141
The two opinions are diametrically opposed as to the
proper interpretive theory. Generally, a judge is not to
consult legislative histories when the language of a statute
140 For an explanation of Chan and its Constitutional implications insofar as the
Warsaw Convention is concerned, see Note, Chan v. Korean Air Lines: The United
States Supreme Court 'Shoots Down' Notice Requirements under the Warsaw Convention, 3
TRANSNAT'L LAw. 363, 386-88 (1990) (authored by Richard Manuel Clark).
,41 Id. at 151. Ultimately, the applicable standard under the concurrence is
whether the notice is minimally legible. Otherwise, it is no notice at all. And, as a
matter of interpretation of the Warsaw Convention, this failure removes the air
carrier's liability protection under the Treaty. The carrier's obligation under the
Montreal Agreement, however, is of no relevance to a determination of the extent
of liability. Violations of the Montreal Agreement are subject only to FAA sanc-
tions, if applicable. Id.
or treaty is clear and unambiguous. 42 Article 3 may very
well contain such clear language. In this respect, the con-
currence's position that article 3 is susceptible to at least
two readings is somewhat forced. Justice Brennan dem-
onstrates that one could torture any statute to strip it of
its "unambiguous" status and so consult drafting histories
ultimately to arrive at a position contrary to the "plain
meaning."
Even so, one is hard-pressed to say the majority carries
the day. The drafting histories of the Treaty present com-
pelling evidence that a uniform regime of sanctions was
intended for articles 3, 4 and 8. A strict, literal approach
to the Treaty may have prevented the Court from effectu-
ating the intentions of the drafters. And yet, a policy ori-
ented approach lends itself to the danger of judicial
abrogation of the Warsaw Convention. 4 '
III. CONCLUSION
The practical effect of Chan confines the litigation strat-
egy of counsel seeking to avoid the damages cap on pas-
142 I. at 134.
14- The interpretive styles of the majority and the concurrence are categorized
as the new textualist approach and the traditionalist approach respectively. Es-
kridge, The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 621 (1990). The New Textualist
rejects legislative histories on the grounds that courts only have jurisdiction to
adjudicate laws passed, not thoughts undergone. Id. at 649. Reliance on legisla-
tive history to reject the plain meaning of the statute violates bicameralism be-
cause the views of a legislative subgroup supersede the voice of Congress as a
whole. Id. Additionally, this reliance misrepresents the President's view by read-
ing into the statute a meaning the President may not have considered when he
signed it. Id. at 649-50 (discussing presentment).
Traditionalism, on the other hand, embraces legislative histories because it en-
ables courts to carry out an essential function: implementing the original intent of
the enacting Congress. Id. at 626. An inspection of Committee Reports, sponsor
statements, rejected proposals, floor and hearing colloquy, views of non-legislator
drafters, legislative inaction, and subsequent legislative history allows the courts
to faithfully effectuate the intent and purpose of the supreme lawmaking body. Id.
at 636. Rejection of such legislative records in deference to the plain-meaning
results, on occasion, in judicial interpretations that contravene Congressional in-
tentions. Id. at 627. See also NoteJustice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Consti-
tutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160 (authored by
Arthur Stock).
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sengers to basically one argument: wilful misconduct. 144
Because it is extremely difficult to prove wilful miscon-
duct, international air carriers are likely to enjoy a
$75,000 liability limit for each passenger as long as the
United States continues its adherence to the Warsaw Con-
vention. Congressional attention to dissatisfaction with
the Warsaw Convention is therefore likely to increase.
The aviation industry long ago outgrew the need for spe-
cial protection. 14 - More importantly, limited liability on
tort recovery is anathema to the American ideal of full
compensation to injured victims by those responsible for
the harm. Events like the recent tragedy of the Pan Am
Flight 103 bombing in Lockerbie, Scotland and the Soviet
attack upon Korean Air Lines Flight 007 focus attention
on the shortcomings of the Treaty. Should the air car-
rier's liability remain limited to $75,000 per passenger, an
uproar before Congress is likely to follow.
The United States has in the past expressed its dislike
of the Warsaw Convention. With tragedies like those
mentioned above, it is likely to do so again. Dissatisfac-
tion with the Treaty, however, has not yet led to the kind
of legislative action that will meaningfully protect passen-
gers. Instead, protection came from the courts which
confined the Treaty to its purpose as best they could, hop-
ing to avoid the unfairness.
Chan removes the judicial response. Thus, passengers
now have two means to protect themselves. They can
purchase insurance, or they can lobby for legislative abro-
gation of the Treaty. By foreclosing the judicial response,
the Supreme Court may very well have cleared the way for
the latter action. Without a more flexible judicial ap-
proach to the Warsaw Convention, litigants are likely to
turn to the majoritarian branches of the government. The
. 1" Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 25. Article 3(2) does authorize
unlimited liability in the event of ticket non-delivery, but this situation is highly
unlikely to occur. See supra note 27.
14 W. Turley, AVIATION LITIGATION, § 5.06 (1986).
[56
1991] CASENOTES 967
political response to Chan should finally lead to the kind
of Congressional action that is long overdue.
Thomas A. Adeson

